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There is an invisible frontier that delimits the concept and, more importantly, the practices of 
decentralization and privatization.  It is the way in which these concepts are interpreted and 
consequently the way they are carried out.  To visualize this frontier, the meaning of 




An early observer of contemporary institutional change, Rondinelli (1987) 
defined decentralization as: 
 
“the transfer of planning, decision making or management functions 
from the central government and its agencies to field organizations, 
subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corpora-
tions, area-wide or regional development organizations, specialized 
functional authorities or non-governmental organizations”. (1987:31). 
 
Decentralization, Rondinelli argued, could be distinguished “by the degree of 
authority and power, or the scope of functions, which the government of a 
sovereign state transfers to or shares with other organizations within its 
jurisdiction”.  He categorized what he saw into four forms: deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution and transfer to non-government institutions.  In a 
review of political events in Asia, he found each of these four forms of 
decentralization to exist.   
 
Briefly, and according to Rondinelli (1987),  
 
“Deconcentration involves the transfer of functions within the central 
                                           
1 Revision of a paper presented at the Association for International Agricultural and 
Extension Education (AIAEE), held in Arlington, VA, March 2000.  A more extensive 
version of this paper appears in F. Brewer (ed.); (2002); Agricultural Extension: An 
International Perspective; N. Chelmsford, MA: Erudition Books. 
2 College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of Maryland, College Park, E-
mail: wr11@umail.umd.edu. 




government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from central 
ministries to field officers, the creation of field agencies, or the shifting of 
responsibility to local administrative units that are part of the central 
government structure”. 
 
“Delegation involves the transfer of functions to regional or functional 
development authorities, parastatal organizations, or special project 
implementation units that often operate free of central government 
regulations ..., and that act as an agent for the state in performing prescribed 
functions with the ultimate responsibility for them remaining with the central 
government”. 
 
“Devolution involves the transfer of function or decision making authority to 
legally incorporate local governments, such as states, provinces, districts or 
municipalities.” 
 
“Transfer to Non-government Institutions involves shifting responsibilities 
for activities from the public sector to private or quasi-public organizations 
that are not part of the government structure” (p. 31-32). 
 
Each of these four forms of decentralization, Rondinelli pointed out, may 
involve distinct variations.  For instance, he cites five variations of 
deconcentration. 
 
Rondinelli considered decentralization to be the defining concept for changes 
taking place as a result of central governments transferring responsibility for 
certain functions to agencies or organizations beyond the border, so to speak, 




Not everybody agreed; some authors3 (Prokopenko, 1995) considered any effort 
at public sector decentralization to be a form of privatization.  Indeed, to 
privatize public sector agricultural extension was a policy option that became 
seemingly mandatory during and following the mid-1980s for, mostly, 
developed countries. Strictly speaking, privatization means a full transfer of 
ownership, usually by way of sale, from government to a private entity.  In 
this sense, the privatization of agricultural extension for instance has taken 
place in only a few high-income countries, e.g., The Netherlands, New 
                                           
3 Personal correspondence dated October 1995, with Dr. Joseph Prokopenko, Chief, 
Management Development Department, International Labour Organization. 




Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in subgovernment segments of developed 
countries such as certain states in Australia.  However, the term as applied to 
agricultural extension is often broadly conceived to include efforts by 
developed and developing4 countries to decentralize their institutions (Rivera 
& Cary 1997).  
 
Smith (1997) pointed out a fundamental difference in the two terms, 
privatization and decentralization, and labelled that difference "market and non-
market".  The distinction proposed by Smith between market-oriented and non-
market oriented strategies made plain that these two concepts involved quite 
different ideological orientations having distinctly different implications in 
terms of development expectations. Smith observed that market reforms 
introduce or move toward varying degrees of privatization and that non-
market reforms involve central government transferring authority for a 
certain function to other, lower-level, government authorities or other 
organizations that fall outside its immediate jurisdiction. Decentralization is 
considered a non-market strategy for shifting authority for delivery of 
extension to other public-sector agencies or private-sector organizations but 
utilizing public-sector funding arrangements.  And privatization is considered 
a market strategy whereby authority for extension delivery may be provided 
either by the public or private sectors, but funding for extension services (and 
also delivery when total privatization is operative) is derived from private 
sources, either by companies or farmer entities. 
 
In sum, these two major concepts -- decentralization and privatization -- have 
dominated the literature and practice of extension throughout the decades of the 
19980s and 90s and into the present 21st century. Often used conjointly, along 
with various other concepts that have emerged, such as pluralism, partnership 
and participation, these two concepts not only dominated discussion but also, in 
some respects, muddied the waters of discussion. 
 
3. PUBLIC SECTOR FUNDING AND DELIVERY STRATEGIES FOR 
DECENTRALIZING AND PRIVATIZING AGRICULTURAL 
EXTENSION 
 
One way of highlighting distinctions between decentralization and privatization 
strategies for reforming agricultural and rural extension is to examine these two 
main strategies in terms of who funds and who delivers the services.  
                                           
4 The terms "developed" and "developing" are intended to be suggestive. For classifications 
of economies into low-income, (lower and higher) middle-income and (OECD and non-
OECD) high-income countries, see: The World Bank (1995), Social Indicators of 
Development, p. 392 ff 
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or devolution to other public 
sector agencies 
 
Examples: Public funding 
and management of 
extension systems, e.g., 
deconcentration to field 
(branch) offices, devolution 
to subnational government, 
or joint budgeting/delivery 
with farmer associations. 
 Strategies: 
Cost recovery strategies 
employed by public sector 
institutions and agents 
 
Examples: Public management 
with private funding through 
direct charging, e.g., fee-based 
or contract-based services paid 







Strategies: Delegation of 
management to parastatal or 




Examples: Public funding 
(through vouchers or credit 
to small farmers), with 
parastatal or private sector 
(including farm 
organization) management 
of delivery services. 
 Strategies: 
Transfer of public sector 




Examples: Private funding 
and management 
("privatization") of public 




Diagram 1: Funding and delivery of agricultural extension as related to 
decentralisation and privatisation 
 
• Public funding, public delivery. In this case the public sector -- whether 
central, state or local government -- funds and manages extension systems. 
The original determination to decentralise is made by the central 
government utilising one or another of the following strategies: 
deconcentration to field (branch) offices, devolution to subnational 
government, or joint budgeting/delivery with farmer associations.  
 
• Public funding, private delivery.  In this case the public sector funds 
extension (through vouchers, credits to farmers, or other fiscal arrangement), 
while a parastatal, private sector company or farmer organization manages 
and delivers the extension services.  The shift of public sector authority for 




extension management and delivery is sometimes referred to as "subsidiary" 
or the transfer of authority to the grassroots level. 
 
Decentralisation strategies raise several issues, particularly those relating to 
fiscal arrangements as well as human and political capacity.  A major concern 
regarding fiscal arrangements is “fiscal federalism”.  Fiscal federalism is the shift 
of money either directly or in the form of authority to raise taxes by the lower 
level of government. Shah (1994) argues that decentralisation exists in name 
only when there is not this concurrent shift. He considers "fiscal federalism" to 
be critical for (a) more efficient and equitable provision of public services such 
as agricultural extension and (b) greater participation of local government in the 
processes of financing and managing such services. 
 
Decentralising to lower levels of government or to other organisational entities 
also requires in most cases upgrading administrative and technical capacity.  To 
implement programs effectively, staff must have the capacity to translate 
intentions into reality.  Leonard (1983) notes that in addition to technical and 
management skills, however, an organisation has to “produce a decision to act, 
to sustain the legitimacy of that decision against internal and external 
challenges, and to mobilise the human and material resources needed to execute 
the program chosen.  These attributes are ‘political’.  They derive from the 
interaction of leadership and institutional history” (1983:274). 
 
• Private funding, public delivery.  In this case the private sector provides the 
funding for extension.  This funding is gained through one or another form 
of direct charging, e.g., fee-based or contract-based services paid directly by 
farmers.  Such cost recovery strategies may be employed by public sector 
institutions or by the technical agents that represent the public sector. 
 
• Private funding, private delivery.  In this case the private sector has either 
acquired or developed (commercialised) the public sector extension services 
and thus assumes responsibility for funding, management and delivery of 
the services.  Transactions are concluded on a contractual or other cost-
recovery basis.  Agricultural economists tend to consider this latter strategy 
to be "true" privatisation.  In this paper however, as already stated, the third 
case -- involving private funding-public delivery in which cost-recovery 
applies -- is considered a form of privatisation. 
 
The direction toward privatising agricultural extension and charging fees for 
agricultural knowledge has brought about both negative and positive results. 
Countries with an important agricultural base are confronted by the arguments 
in favour of efficiencies resulting from the profit motive, emphasis on 




monocropping and marketing for export, and the contribution of agriculture to 
GNP growth.  As a result, while reluctant to rescind all control of agricultural 
extension services, governments are ever more cognisant of the value of 
changing their agricultural funding arrangements to promote greater efficiency 
in costs and benefits.  Even developing countries are considering alternative 
funding arrangements, such as fee-payments, privatisation or commercialisation 
as inevitable responses to the pressures of world trade, exponentially expanding 
populations, and the greater demand for domestic and imported food. 
 
The advantages associated with privatisation are several.  They include: (a) the 
attention to the profit motive and the resultant inclination toward greater cost-
effectiveness, (b) the reduction of costs for production and the use of these 
savings for market purposes, (c) the involvement of extension staff in all aspects 
of the production-processing-transportation-marketing chain, (d) the shift from 
a "technology push" to a "demand pull" orientation and greater responsibility to 
the client, (e) the emphasis on benefits and results, not just service activities, and 
(f) the contribution of privatisation to greater involvement of the private sector 
in information transfer.  
 
Privatisation however is not a simplifying strategy. It alters the inter-
organisational fields that impact public and private services. The trade-offs 
involved in adapting to private sector hegemony have to be weighed carefully if 
national imperatives and the values of democratic government are to be 
preserved. 
 
Privatisation shifts agricultural knowledge from being a public good to a 
private good with consequent cost and property-right factors involved.  One 
fear is that big business will not be client-oriented and demand-driven, indeed 
that business is more likely to pursue the course for which public sector 
extension was criticised, i.e., for promoting a supply-driven orientation to 
knowledge transfer. The content of agricultural extension also raises 
important questions, not least because it involves multiple issues relating to 
food security and the nutritional value and safety of food, as well as the 
sustainability of productive land and water and the environmental health of 
the planet. 
 
The arguments opposed to privatisation of information and agricultural 
industrialisation are that: There is a greater likelihood of misinformation 
when knowledge is controlled by the private sector.  There is a greater 
prospect of monopoly power, and with such power the likelihood of coercion 
of legislators by multi-nationals. There is greater control of the market by 
private companies.  There is a diminution of biodiversity as a result of 




increasing agricultural specialisation and precision agriculture. There are dire 
possible consequences of genetically altered seeds (possibility the spread of 
unwanted plants, comparable to the spread of kudzu is the southern United 
States.)  Some argue that crops are being lost to insects today because plants 
are getting weaker from soil that is dying because it is increasingly lacking in 
nutrients.  Still others oppose the chemicalisation of agriculture, arguing that 
it is untrue and generally unrecognised by the general public, and not 
admitted or countenanced by the scientific community, that returns to small 
farming and organic farming can feed the expanding world population 
(Govindasamy, 2000). Others argue that small farms are more productive than 
large farms, and add that small farms are being threatened by the WTO 
negotiations (Rosset, 1999). 
 
4. CAVEATS REGARDING INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
 
One of the expectations of decentralization and privatization strategies is the 
advancement of institutional pluralism, that is, the involvement of various 
public and private sector institutions in the delivery, and also the funding in 
some cases, of agricultural and rural extension services. But is institutional 
pluralism the answer?  Originally suggesting simply a composite of players in 
the provision of extension services, the concept of institutional pluralism is 
currently being re-examined and re-defined to embrace the concept of 
partnership. When central government contracts for service delivery or 
otherwise presumes to share authority with other organizations that fall within 
its jurisdiction, there is some question as to the equality of the relationship.  
 
Bebbington and Kopp (1998), in their study of pluralistic developments in 
Bolivia, state that “...the increasing tendency of government to engage in 
contractual arrangements with NGOs, under which the NGOs merely 
implemented government programmes, has often served to weaken the 
identity and legitimacy of NGOs, although it did provide them with much 
needed funding”. Similarly, Anderson and Crowder (2000) argue that 
“contracting out tends to be an administrative or technocratic approach where 
governments and/or donors promote contracting for a variety of fairly 
economic rationales.  However, they also tend to try and keep methodological 
and conceptual control, which can limit learning and flexibility....  While often 
advocating the existence of several partners, these approaches do little to 
encourage pluralistic partnerships...” (Anderson & Crowder 2000). 
 
Decentralising suggests that central government relegate its responsibilities to 
another body -- except in the case of deconcentration wherein control essentially 
remains with the central government.  The simple transfer of power to a lower 




level of government or other organization appears not to be the answer to 
institutional reform -- although it might reduce the budget of a central 
government in the short term.  Such a step may ignore the importance and need 
for central government to be involved in a number of public sector 
responsibilities (e.g., policy direction, the (full or partial) funding of public 
good services, training of subgovernment staff, system standardization, 
accountability, etc.).  As Leonard noted early on (1983), what is needed is “not 
power for either central or local organizations, but complementary strength in 
both”.  Also, not to be forgotten is that fact hat decentralization can lead to more 
and cheaper control by industry, as past U.S. President James Madison argued. 
The fact that government is local may make its councils easier to influence. 
 
Another issue is that of stakeholder participation in program development 
decision-making and, depending on the extent of the participatory involvement, 
management processes.  This issue alerts us to other ways of examining the 
question of decentralization, not only from the standpoint of structure and 
physicality but management (Rivera 1996). Governments are beginning to move 
institutionally and technically toward putting responsibility into the hands of 
farmers to manage agricultural extension programs. Participatory involvement 
is considered to make services more responsive to local conditions, more 
accountable, more effective and more sustainable. The success of the U.S. 
Cooperative Extension System results in part from on its emphasis on a high 
degree of local level participation and control, with county agents accountable to 
their local constituency. Partnership efforts in information delivery and 
education support programs characterize the systems and its strengths. For 
developing countries to realize the benefits of participatory decentralization, 
according to the World Bank, "the role of the public sector has to be redefined to 
permit multiple approaches which account for user diversity, and to develop 
partnerships with farmer organizations, NGOs and the private sector for service 
delivery" (World Bank 1995). 
 
5. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Contrary to the view that national extension systems have outlived their 
usefulness, the fact remains that national policy and assistance for certain public 
sector extension services are needed. For instance, new priorities are coming 
into play that could, and should, force reexamination of the role of the public 
sector, especially as it relates to public good services such as agricultural 
extension. Challenges involving liberalized trade, food security, poverty 
alleviation, environmental protection, these and other formidable tasks, confront 
national government, and cannot be met adequately by local and state 
(provincial, regional) government. There are national issues relating to 




agricultural and rural information dissemination, for instance, that go beyond 
the capacity and authority of subgovernments to resolve for nations as a whole. 
 
The same may be said for privatisation. Certainly, the world has expanded 
beyond the global village, a reality that also affects nations and their public 
sector institutions, such as agricultural extension. Globalisation is inextricably 
linked to privatisation, and countries find themselves confronted with a new 
and highly competitive global market. Major economic restructuring is taking 
place in both developed and developing countries, and has greatly changed 
the balance of the public and private sectors (Fresco 2000). Nonetheless, 
government is not a business concerned primarily with profit, but a political 
organisation with the function of governing people and seeing to their 
welfare.  While economics may be a primary, it is not the only, concern.  Thus 
while institutional and systemic reform remains critical for responding to 
production and food security purposes, national policymakers responsible for 
directing extension find themselves called upon to consider its role in the 
development of rural economies, social equity, and the protection of the 
environment. This demands a serious review of public sector extension. 
 
New responsibilities require a more inclusive paradigm for extension, one 
that recognises extension's role in educating consumers and retailers as well 
as producers. International organisations and governments are already 
anticipating new challenges and new priorities, including the emergence of 
new clientele and the impact of global urbanisation. As cities expand, the 
frontiers between urban, peri-urban and rural activity are blurring and 
merging.  In the next two decades leaders world-wide may well find 
themselves confronting again the question of public sector extension's role, 
with a view then to the renewal of its scope and purpose, rather than rushing 
to shift that role to the private sector. 
 
While technical concerns may be met by private sector entities, social and 
environmental concerns may not.  Increasingly the multi-functional nature of 
agriculture is being recognised (FAO/Netherlands 1999). It may not be too 
early to re-consider the concepts, and the implications, of privatising and 
decentralising central government functions by associating them with market 
and non-market institutional reforms. Serious issues emerge in discussion of 
these two major ways of thinking about contemporary government 
institutional reform. As Eicher states (2001), “there are some tough questions 
to be addressed in the current debate on the privatisation of extension in rural 
areas.” As for decentralising, these strategies are in their infancy in countries 
such as Colombia and Uganda.  And the jury is still out on current efforts to 
develop subsidiarity in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.   




6. ADOPTING A VISION OF BALANCE OF POWERS 
 
While the concepts of decentralization and privatization may have been 
innovative and useful at a time when public sector failures were more than 
apparent especially in agriculture, analysis and preliminary evidence are 
beginning to show that the concepts are limited in their constructs and 
predictable outcomes.  In short, although useful strategies for central 
government -- for various financial and managerial purposes -- they lack 
vision. 
 
The vision that is lacking has to do with the responsibilities of national 
government, including governance and social welfare as well as overall 
political and economic development.  What is that vision?  It is the vision in 
which would fit the sundry concepts already mentioned -- decentralization, 
privatization, pluralism and participation -- and would involve the much 
larger and more socio-politically meaningful concept and practice of creating 
a more equitable sociopolitical and economic balance of powers among the 
various levels of government and the existing or not-yet-existing private 
sector (by “not-yet-existing" I refer to situations in countries where farmer 
unions and organizations are missing, or where profit-oriented private 
organisations are overly controlled by government). 
 
Government engagement in services such as agricultural extension are 
necessary of course for market purposes, both to gain national income from 
exports and to ensure food security among the domestic population, both 
urban and rural.  But agriculture provides social benefits not valued by the 
market: environmental protection, food security and the maintenance of rural 
communities. These latter values are often used for protectionist purposes and 
form the rationale for tariff and non-tariff distortions in food prices 
(Economist, 2001:69); they are nonetheless aspects of the multi-functionality of 
agriculture and constitute important issues. 
 
Decentralization, as it refers to the transfer of responsibility to lower levels of 
government, e.g. in agricultural extension, ignores the importance of a central 
(federal) government in providing policy direction, funding of service for the 
public good, training of subgovernment staff, system standardization, and 
accountability. Privatization also, as it refers to the transfer of responsibility to 
the private venture companies, ignores the importance of a central (federal) 
government in providing guidance in certain areas where only government in 
concord with its communities can act responsibly, such as environmental 
protection.   
 




Other current concepts, such as participation (although important and 
needed) are partial pieces in the puzzle of development.  Important and 
needed, participatory programs often help participants gain the knowledge, 
critical skills and self confidence to make decisions about management based 
on their own experiments, observations and analyses so that the forest can 
sustainably provide them benefits suitable to their livelihood needs. This is 
the case with recently developed agricultural and rural extension programs 
promoted by the FAO/UN with assistance from the World Bank, e.g. FFS 
(Farmer Field Schools) and FFMS (Farmer Forest Management Schools).  Such 
programs provide a platform for participant negotiation in the process of 
farming or determining the intended use of community resources. 
Participatory processes such as FFS and FFMS help clientele build a sense of 
ownership through involvement in program decision-making and 
management.  They are valuable and should be seen as an important effort in 
the development of balance of powers within nation states. 
 
At best, decentralisation and privatisation are partial strategies, as are the 
strategies of pluralism and participation.  Democratic development depends 
not on transferring authority for services that should remain at least in part a 
central (federal) government concern but rather on the sharing of power 
through political, economic, social and technical instrumentalities that 
enhance balance of powers. As noted earlier, “the role of the public sector has 
to be redefined to permit multiple approaches which account for user 
diversity, and to develop partnership with farmer organisations, NGOs, and 
the private sector for service delivery “ (World Bank 1995). 
 
While decentralizing and privatizing elements are needed, the vision 
underlying the enactment of these and other purposive strategies must be 
viewed with an eye to the role of central government, and not just to its 
dismantlement or transfer of power.  A balance-of-power vision involves a 
more equitable and broad-based set of players in national development and is 
the premise on which contemporary policy-driven strategies need to be built.  
 
Governments and international organizations have not yet gone far enough to 
promote such a vision.  Decentralization, privatization and participatory 
decision making efforts lack a holistic vision of the various roles of different 
sectors (including central government) in advancing democratic development 
within nations and the sectors of their society, including and especially in the 
domain of agricultural and rural development. There is still an “invisible 
frontier” that stands formidably between piecemeal measures and a 
comprehensive vision that aims at developing policy and practice that ensures 




a more equitable balance of powers among people.  And this is no where more 
evident than in the agricultural and rural sectors. 
 
In short, balance of power is needed and should constitute the long-term 
overall vision and purpose of reform. This vision would encompass the 
distribution of power between the central authority and other constituent 
government units and the promotion of a private-sector that advances the 
development and independence of organized groups around their special 
economic and social interests. In short, this vision would mean the 
advancement of balance of power (a) among the various levels of government 
(central, state [regional, provincial, governorate]), (b) between the public and 
private sectors, and (c) between government and associations, including 
organized citizens. Such balance of power does not exist in developing 





The present review of agricultural and rural extension reform literature is 
intended to highlight the need for a new vision within which to reformulate 
reform strategies.  Its purpose is to traverse “the invisible frontier” where the 
current limits of decentralization and privatization strategies operate and to 
break through into a more meaningful vision that promotes balance of powers 
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